Abstract-To ensure reliable and predictable service in the electrical grid it is important to gauge the level of trust present within critical components and substations. Although trust throughout a smart grid is temporal and dynamically varies according to measured states, it is possible to accurately formulate communications and service level strategies based on such trust measurements. Utilizing an effective set of machine learning and statistical methods, it is shown that establishment of trust levels between substations using behavioral pattern analysis is possible. It is also shown that the establishment of such trust can facilitate simple secure communications routing between substations.
INTRODUCTION

A. Overview
Grid trust modeling has been a hot topic over the past several years. The more recent models researched include fuzzy logic based [1] [2] [3] and node statistical reputation analysis [4] [5] [6] [7] . Although the merits of the routing logic for [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] are evident, there are limitations in the individual node trust measurement methodologies of each. The fuzzy logic approach assumes that evidence supporting trust decisions and actionable policies are fuzzy in nature. In such cases fuzzy logic based on fuzzy set theory is a logical choice which relies primarily on if-then logic to make trust policy decisions. Fuzzy logic works by allowing a qualitative decision to be programmed into if-then logic. In a fuzzy trust model, degrees of trustworthiness are associated with each conditional statement, and its effectiveness relies on correct selection of fuzzy set values of each conditional statement. If the fuzzy set values which act as threat detection thresholds are not correctly selected, then threat detection accuracy will be decreased.
The node statistical reputation analysis approach [4] [5] [6] [7] , uses centralized data aggregators to collect data from grid nodes. Generative models compensating for the grid's network hierarchy and possible data integrity losses, select the most probable threat indicating count variables. The centralized processors using statistical models locate anomalies in the selected count variables for each node and associate a degree of trustworthiness to each. A major limitation in this approach is that anomaly detection and trust level assignment is centralized. If one of the centralized processors fails, then the trust states for many nodes is unknown for a period. Additionally, having centralized processors may lead to data processing bottlenecks as the processors are required to execute computationally intensive statistical anomaly detection algorithms at high-throughput rates.
The methods devised in this research do not suffer from the limitations of [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] . In the case of fuzzy logic trust models, improper selection of fuzzy set values can lead to inaccurate assignment of node trust levels. The methods described in this paper do not rely solely on domain expert qualitative values for assignment of trust levels, but rather each node (substation) bases trust levels on statistical anomaly detection of local data and local threat pattern training datasets. Additionally, unlike with [4] [5] [6] [7] which process centrally, compute intensive anomaly detection algorithms are executed in a distributed fashion at each substation.
Each of these lines of research [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] relies on singular devised threat detection algorithms. Although such singular methods are useful in conceptually differentiating between various trust models, they fail to take full advantage of powerful machine learning based threat detection algorithms. Alternatively, the research described in this paper uses realworld grid substation system security logs and contemporary machine learning algorithms to accurately and efficiently detect security threats. In a complimentary manner, both unsupervised and supervised machine learning is employed to identify, quantify, and predict harmful behaviors. Harmful behaviors are expressed as threat levels and these threat levels are associated with each substation within a grid. Although not the primary focus of this paper, in this research it is shown that given a substation threat level, it is possible to devise a simple secure message routing scheme between substations. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II effective machine learning based threat detection methods are described. In Section III, experimental results are discussed. In section IV an equation specifying how derived threat levels can be used in facilitating secure routing decisions between substations and specific limitations is discussed. Section V concludes with a summary of the benefits of using these methods in secure substation communications.
B. Background
As shown in Figure 1 below, efficient grid power generation, transmission, and distribution is coordinated via a centralized grid control center. From the control center, reliable and secure management of the grid is maintained. Transmission generation and distribution supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) communications messages regularly travel between the control center via the security gateway which resides within the confines of the substation. Distributed data sources conduct bidirectional communications and power transmission via an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). Sensors and controls within the switch yard and substation monitor and maintain control of transformers, switches, bus bars, etc., to ensure that generated power delivered from power generation sources is safely and properly delivered to consumers. The switch yard and substation meets power demand by transforming high voltage transmission and distributed energy source power to proper levels and phase suitable for individual consumers.
C. Communications and Security
The substation security gateway (SG) shown in Figure 1 . The SG contains firewall ingress and egress communication rules for traffic entering or leaving the substation. According to the firewall rules, specific protocols and ports are monitored and blocked to protect substation and switch yard equipment from malicious traffic. The SG also contains a web interface used for configuration management, system logging to record events and TCP/IP packet captures, a serial communications I/O stack to connect with sensors and controls, additional communications stacks including SSH, VPN, IPSec and SFT, SNMP used for reporting equipment events to the control center and other substations, key stores and authentication modules in support of the secure communications protocols.
Although communications are encrypted, firewalled and protected from malware; such measures do not protect systems from zero-day threats, unintentional malware downloads, the effects of inadequate vendor supply chain security, or insider malicious use. To counter these later threats, statistical and behavioral analysis methods must be used to detect their presence and calculate a corresponding threat level. This paper describes a systematic approach for determining threat levels and establishing trust between substations using statistical machine learning methods such that secure routing of messages is facilitated between substations.
II. MACHINE LEARNING AND THREAT DETECTION
A. Behavioral Features
As described earlier, grid communications are conducted using numerous application protocols transported over serial, cellular data, radio frequency (RF) mesh and wired or wireless TCP/IP. Many traditional behavioral anomaly detection methods inspect transport frame or packet elements to detect suspicious traffic patterns. However, in many cases messages are encrypted making it difficult or impossible to inspect essential frame or packet elements. In such cases, analysis of unencrypted application layer data is used. In this paper, behavioral anomaly detection methods that relay on data captures from unencrypted substation SG system logs (syslogs) are described. Using SG syslog records, it is shown that it's possible to characterize behavior patterns at the substation level and determine a corresponding threat level.
The SG syslog contains recorded client authentication and access control actions, network and system administrative actions. Each syslog record contains a timestamp, severity, facility, tag and message field. Additionally, each syslog record contains a human readable free-form message field where additional amplifying information regarding the record is contained.
In the research, SG syslog and TCP/IP substation packet capture data is sampled over specified sampling speeds and time intervals with each interval termed as an event window (EW). Collected data is organized into individually timestamped datasets.
B. Feature Significance
The amount of variance exhibited by individual features relative to principal components is important when considering the significance of those features relative to a specific model. Principal components analysis (PCA) [8] is used to restrict analysis to finding anomalies in the most significant information carrying syslog features, and those exhibiting the least information carrying potential are discarded.
C. Substation Threat Levels
Equation 1 below is used to calculate the behavioral based threat level determined for a substation within the grid. and coefficients through are heuristically weighted according to a specific security profile determined by security analysts. The station threat level Ƭi is inversely proportional to the trust assigned to a substation: the higher the threat level, the lower the trust level. Given the relative threat level of substations in a grid, a control center can make intelligent communications and service routing decisions. In the following sections, the derivation of each term of Equation 1 is described, followed by a discussion in Section IV of how Ƭi is used in secure routing decisions.
D. Message Class Metric
The message field for a recorded event contains human readable text used to help a security analyst better understand the nature of a security event. Unlike the other fields in an SG syslog record, there is no guarantee that predefined labels will be used to convey a specific message to an analyst. Rather, the contents of the message field requires human language interpretation abilities to properly interpret and classify its meaning. Using natural language processing (NLP) [9] [10] text classification methods, each message field is assigned a security relative threat value or alert level from 1 to (a) with 1 being the least threatening and a being the most threatening. The message class metric (Mi) represents the calculated composite alert level for all SG syslog records contained with an event window i. Mi (Equation 2) is found for each event window (EWi) and the relative threat level set is {1,2,3,…,a}. 
E. Entropy Monitoring
When monitoring successive event windows over time, those features exhibiting the most variance have a greater threat carrying probability than those that do not. Additionally, an increase in relative entropy between such feature distributions contained within successive event windows (ie. EWi versus EWi+1) can indicate an increased level of potentially threatening activities. Features behaving in this manner are probable threat indicators, and are of interest when establishing a level of trust for a substation.
Two highly useful entropy monitoring methods are described in this section. The first method called Block Entropy Analysis (BEA) uses a semi-supervised machine learning [11] method to detect patterns in individual event windows to sense when global changes in relative entropy between successive event windows occurs. The second method devised called Feature Centric Entropy Analysis (FCEA) compares individual feature distribution relative entropy changes in successive event windows. BEA measures the total relative entropy (Ei ) between successive event windows and therefore the probability that threats exist in a EWi, while FCEA tells us which features are associated with a sensed threat in an EWi and the probability (Si) that threats match a known threat signature. During threat monitoring, BEA allows one to efficiently find the probability that a EWi contains threats prior to employing the less computationally efficient FCEA.
F. Block Entropy Analysis
The goal of BEA is to determine if an EWi has a high probability of containing threats. The first step in performing BEA involves a form of unsupervised learning called Competitive Neural Network Learning (CNNL) [12] [13] . In CNNL, artificial neural network (ANN) neurons are randomly weighted such that each node competes for the right to respond to input vectors contained within an EWi. EWi 's feature count vectors are essentially clustered according to which network neurons were given the right to respond to specific vectors. In BEA the relative entropy of event window competitive layer neuron output distributions are compared. If the relative entropy or KL-Divergence (DKLB) [14] , as defined in Equation 3 , measured between two event windows exceeds a heuristically derived threshold (DKLB > ʈ), the event window is deemed anomalous. K-L Divergence measures the relative entropy change between outputs neuron and distributions, where Ɛ is a baseline event window probability distribution and Ɛ is a target or test probability distribution.
G. Feature Centric Entropy Analysis
In BEA the probability that an event window contains threats is found, but no indication of the nature of the threat is given. FCEA, on the other hand, can identify threat signatures by comparing individual feature distribution relative entropies. Using Equation 4, individual feature distribution K-L Divergence values are calculated for baseline and test event windows. In Equation 4, K-L Divergence measures the relative entropy change between feature and distributions. Where is a baseline feature probability distribution within a baseline event window and is a target or test probability distribution within the test event window.
If DKLF exceeds a heuristically derived threshold (DKLF > Ƭ), the feature is deemed anomalous.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Experiments
To illustrate the accuracy of the methods described in Section II, baseline and test datasets were created by sampling SG data from a microgrid emulation laboratory. Baseline data consisted of 16 consecutive days (approximately 30K records) of normal client activities logged in the laboratory's SG syslog. The test dataset consisted of 16 days (approximately 30K records), of the laboratory's SG syslog data mixed with threat patterns. In the sections that follow, a discussion of the results of the data analysis using the devised methods is included.
B. Threat Detection Results
Using the baseline and test datasets described in Section III.A, the data was processed. Only those vector features exhibiting the highest variance were subsequently processed by the MCM, BEA, and FCEA processors. The substation threat level Ƭi for each event window EWi contained in the test dataset were then calculated using Equation 1 and Mi, Ei and Si values. High threat detection accuracy was observed as illustrated in the receiver operating characteristic curve in Figure 2 . 
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Secure Routing
Knowing grid substation threat levels enables a control center to route monitoring and control traffic through the least threatened paths. Assuming that a distinct normalized Ƭi,u (threat level) is determined for each substation (u) for event window period (i), then the safest transmission route between any two substations in event window i is represented by the set of edges on a grid communications graph with the smallest total threat level as determined by Equation 5 .
Given: c : number of substations along a distinct path from substation g to h, p : unique path index (substation g to h), Ƒp : a unique path's total threat level (substation g to h).
V. CONCLUSIONS
In summary, unlike in [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] , the research in this paper used a consistent real-world cyber SG syslog data set and a diverse set of powerful machine and statistical learning algorithms to derive grid node threat metrics. Additionally, the devised threat detection methods were found to be highly accurate with low false positive and negative rates (Figure 2) . The ability to efficiently translate detected threats to normalized statisticallybased substation threat level metrics was exhibited (III.B). Finally, it was shown that implementing a simple secure substation-to-substation routing scheme using derived substation threat levels is possible.
